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Imagine being born out of wedlock overseas to a non-U.S.
citizen mother and a U.S. citizen father but spending your entire
life in the United States. You befriend another person also born
out of wedlock overseas, but to a U.S. citizen mother and a non-
U.S. citizen father. The two of you commit robbery at a local gas
station. Both of you are convicted and sentenced to eight years in
prison. After your conviction, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) begins removal proceedings against you, but not
against your robbery partner. Why? Because your father failed to
take an administrative step and legitimate you as his child before
you turned eighteen. You always assumed you were a U.S. citizen,
but were mistaken. You never looked into getting a passport, and
you never voted. If you had, your citizenship status would have
been brought to your attention. INS is now planning to send you
"back" to a country you do not know, where you have no family, do
not speak the language, and do not know the culture. In essence,
a country foreign to you. To make matters worse, you find out that
"your" country does not want you back. The INS determines that
you will be held in a detention center until it can make
arrangements with another country for your departure. Do the
Supreme Court and the U.S. government support such a process
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that harms children because of something their fathers failed to
do-something that, arguably, they should not be required to do in
the first place? They do.
In June 2001, the Supreme Court decided Nguyen v. INS.'
Tuan Anh Nguyen (Nguyen) was born out of wedlock in Vietnam
to Joseph Boulais, a U.S. citizen working in Vietnam as an
engineer, and Hung Thi Nguyen, a Vietnamese citizen.2 Soon
after Nguyen's birth, his mother abandoned him and left his
upbringing to his father.3 Boulais subsequently married another
Vietnamese citizen.4 In 1975, Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese
troops. 5 Nguyen, six years old, escaped Vietnam with Boulais'
wife. 6 Nguyen was paroled 7 into the United States as a refugee a
few months later, whereupon he and Boulais were reunited.8
Under the Indochinese Refugee Act, 9 Nguyen gained permanent
1. 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001).
2. See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Nguyen v. INS, 2000 WL 1706737 (2001) (No.
99-2071) (stating that Tuan Anh Nguyen is Boulais and Hung Thu Nguyen's
illegitimate child); Victoria Graham, In the Courts: Sex Bias in Citizenship Law
Challenged, WOMEN'S ENEWS (Jan. 10, 2001) (stating that Boulais was working in
Vietnam as an engineer), at
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/400/context/archive.




7. The U.S. Attorney General has parole power, which allows him or her to
permit any alien seeking admission to the United States to enter temporarily for
emergency reasons or for reasons strictly in the public interest. See DAVID
WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 104 (4th ed.
1998).
8. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 5.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2000). Under this act, the INS granted permanent
resident status to Indochinese refugees without regard to public exclusion,
immigration documentation, or literacy requirements. See id. The purpose of
granting permanent resident status to Indochinese refugees who came from the
former French Indochinese colonies of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was to provide
a sanctuary to the Vietnamese who were considered "at risk" because of their
connection to the United States during the Vietnam War. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THIS MONTH IN IMMIGRATION
HISTORY: JULY 1979 (explaining which countries' refugees qualify under the
Indochinese Refugee Act and describing the reasons for and the process of
evacuation and exodus from Vietnam in 1975 and subsequent years), at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/history/july79.htm (last modified Feb. 4,
2002). Between 1977 and 1997, over 175,000 refugees obtained permanent
residency status under the Indochinese Refugee Act. See IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 92 tbl.31 (1997) (breaking down
the numbers of refugees and asylees granted permanent resident status under




resident status.10 At the age of twenty-two, Nguyen was indicted
and pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault of a minor."
Subsequently, the INS started removal 12 proceedings against
him.13
10. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 5.
11. See Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that Nguyen
pled guilty to two felony charges of assault on a minor); CRIME RECORDS SERV.,
TEX. DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, SEX OFFENDER DATABASE, CRIME RECORD OF TUAN
ANH NGUYEN [hereinafter CRIME RECORD] (listing Nguyen as a sex offender in a
public record available on the internet),
http://records.txdps.state.tx.us/soSearch/soSearch.cfin (last visited Mar. 24, 2002).
12. "Deportation proceedings" are now referred to in statutes as "removal
proceedings." See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, Div. C (1996) (redefining old
immigration terms such as "deport" and "deportation"). Many courts, like the
Nguyen Supreme Court, still use the old terminology in their opinions. See
generally Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001). The new terminology as it
appears in IIRIRA will be used in this Comment.
13. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2053. Under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), the INS may remove an alien if he or she is convicted of a crime of moral
turpitude punishable by a sentence of one year or longer. 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000). "Moral turpitude" is not defined in the INA, but most courts
evaluate whether a crime involves moral turpitude on whether the inherent nature
of the act includes elements that demonstrate the perpetrator's "baseness, vileness
and depravity." Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); see also
Lawyers' Coop. Publ'g Co. & Bancroft-Whitney Co., Annotation, What Constitutes
"Crime Involving Moral Turpitude" Within Meaning of §§ 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and
Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of Aliens
Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. FED. 480 (2000) [hereinafter Lawyer's Coop.
Publ'g Co.] (describing crimes involving moral turpitude as including homicide,
manslaughter, assault, robbery, burglary, embezzlement, extortion, bigamy, incest,
indecent assault, and rape). The INS may also remove an alien who commits two
or more crimes of moral turpitude arising out of different incidences of criminal
misconduct regardless of the possible length of punishment. 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The INS removed more than 350,000 convicted aliens between
1997 and 2001. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 2001 MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT, END OF FY 2001:
REMOVALS (showing that between January 2001 and September 2001, more than
70,000 aliens, over forty percent of the total aliens removed, were removed due to
their convictions not limited to those involving moral turpitude, and during the
2000 fiscal year, more than 71,000 aliens were removed due to their convictions), at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/msrsepOl[REMOVAL.HTM;
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 2000
MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT, END OF FY 2000: REMOVALS (showing that during
the 1999 fiscal year close to 70,000 aliens were removed due to their convictions), at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/msrsepOO/REMOVAL.HTM;
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 1999
MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT, END OF FY 1999: REMOVALS (showing that during
the 1998 fiscal year more than 55,000 aliens were removed due to their
convictions), at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/msrsep99REMOVAL.HTM;
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER
1998 MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT, END OF FY 1998: REMOVALS (showing that
during the 1997 fiscal year more than 51,000 aliens were removed due to their
20021
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Nguyen and his father contested the removal order on the
basis that 8 U.S.C. § 140914 violates the Due Process Clause and
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 15 They
challenged § 1409 because it provides different citizenship
procedures for children born out of wedlock overseas depending on
which parent-the mother or father-is a U.S. citizen. 16 Nguyen
argued that clear and convincing evidence in the form of a DNA
test result showing that Boulais was Nguyen's father was
sufficient to determine parentage. 17 The Supreme Court rejected
this genetic evidence because it was not one of the methods
prescribed for legitimation as articulated by Congress in § 1409.18
Referring to its decision in Miller v. Albright, 19 the Court held
that § 1409 was constitutional under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment because the legitimation procedures were
substantially related to achieving the important governmental
objectives of establishing a biological parent-child relationship and
providing the opportunity for the parent and child to establish a
meaningful relationship. 20  The Court emphasized the "real"
convictions), at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/msrfy98REMOVAL.HTM.
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1409. This section governs the nationality and naturalization of
children born out of wedlock in foreign countries to mothers or fathers who are U.S.
citizens. See id.
15. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2058. Under a literal reading of the Constitution,
the federal government is not required to provide equal protection of the law, but
the Supreme Court has extended the equal protection requirement stated in the
Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, to the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 (1954) (holding school segregation in the District of Columbia
unconstitutional, not under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
because the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to states, but under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (granting automatic U.S. citizenship status to a child of a
citizen mother where the child is born abroad and out of wedlock, but requiring an
affirmative administrative act by a U.S. citizen father for his child to receive U.S.
citizenship); for the text of § 1409 see infra note 55.
17. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060.
18. See id. at 2060-61; infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
19. 523 U.S. 420, 440 (1998) (holding that the additional proof of paternity
required for citizenship by birth where the citizen parent of the child born abroad
and out of wedlock is the father is not an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection based on the sex of the citizen parent); see also discussion infra Part I.B.
(explaining how the INA treats mothers and fathers differently).
20. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057-58. Courts apply intermediate scrutiny to
gender-based classifications. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny to policy denying women admission to
Virginia Military Institute because of their gender and holding that the policy
violated their equal protection rights). A statute overcomes intermediate scrutiny
if the discriminatory means employed are "substantially related" to the
278 [Vol. 20:275
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difference between mothers and fathers based on the required
presence of a mother at the birth of the child. 21 The Court
deferred to Congress' prescribed legitimation requirements for a
U.S. citizen father to transfer citizenship to his non-marital child
born overseas: a sworn declaration of paternity or a court order of
paternity before the child's eighteenth birthday. 22  Upon the
Court's finding that § 1409 was constitutional, the INS executed
Nguyen's removal order.23 Because Vietnam rarely repatriates
deportees from the United States, 24 observers anticipated that the
INS would hold Nguyen in an INS detention center indefinitely. 25
Nguyen's current whereabouts are unknown.26
achievement of "important governmental objectives." Id.
21. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2061. The Court allows different treatment of
men and women where a "real" difference has been exhibited. See, e.g., Virginia,
518 U.S. at 533 (holding that the physical differences between men and women are
"real" and do not make sex a proscribed classification).
22. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060.
23. See Ji Hyun Lim & Associated Press, Mother's Status Determines
Citizenship, ASIANWEEK.COM (June 22, 2001), at
http://www.asianweek.com/2001_06_22/news2 supremecourLcitizen.html.
Immigration procedures permit an alien to challenge an order of removal before it
is executed. See WEISSBRODT, supra note 7, at 215. Once the order of removal is
finalized administratively or after judicial review, or once the alien is released from
detention, whichever is later, the Attorney General has ninety days to remove the
alien from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1).
24. See Amy Ballentine, Commentary: Supreme Court, INS Deal Double Blow to
Children, SISKIND'S IMMIGRATION BULL. (Siskind, Susser, Haas & Devine,
Memphis, Tenn.) (June 15, 2001) (noting that Vietnam does not generally
repatriate criminal aliens from the United States), at
http://www.visalaw.com/01jun3/17jun3O1.html; see also Patricia Flynn et al., Five
Years Later: Fifth Circuit Case Law Developments Under the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 557, 617 (2001)
(stating that Vietnam refuses to repatriate its citizens).
25. See Graham, supra note 2. During the removal period, the alien is held in a
detention center. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). An alien being removed due to criminal
convictions may select a country to which he would like to be removed. 8 U.S.C. §
123 1(b)(2)(A). But if the government of that country does not respond within thirty
days of the request to take the alien back, the Attorney General may designate an
alternative country to which the alien will be deported, the first choice being the
country where the alien is a subject, citizen, or national. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(C),
(D). Where the alien is classified as an "aggravated felon," he may be held longer
than the general six-month limit on detention. See Tran v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp.
469, 475 (W.D. La. 1993). However, recent cases have challenged the
constitutionality of detaining aliens indeterminately in removal holding centers.
See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2498-99 (2001) (holding that the post-
detention-removal statute read in light of the Constitution's demands requires an
alien's detention to be limited to a reasonable period necessary to remove the alien
from the United States and does not permit indefinite detention); see also Marisel
Acosta, "Unremovable" Criminal Resident Aliens Awaiting Deportation: Can the
INS Detain Them Indefinitely?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (arguing that
indefinitely detaining criminal aliens who can not be deported is unconstitutional).
26. It appears that Nguyen is living in Texas, but there is no confirmation. See
2002]
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Part I of this Comment provides the context for the Nguyen
decision through an examination of relevant statutes, legislative
history, and case law preceding the decision.27 Part II explains the
Nguyen holding and reasoning in detail.28 Part III argues that the
Supreme Court had the power to review the legitimation
requirements of § 1409 and criticizes the Court for misapplying
the intermediate scrutiny standard.29 This Comment further
argues that the Court erroneously endorsed outdated images of
fathers, mothers, and families. In conclusion, this Comment finds
that the Court has the power to review the constitutionality of the
means in which Congress exercises its plenary power and that §
1409 discriminates invidiously between mothers and fathers,
resulting in harm to a politically powerless class of people.
I. The Law Prior to Nguyen v. INS
A. Congress Has Plenary Power to Regulate Immigration
and Citizenship, but Its Absoluteness Is Questionable
Congress is a governmental branch of limited powers.3 0 Its
powers include those that are enumerated in Article I of the
Constitution and those deemed "necessary and proper"31 to execute
the enumerated powers. 32  Congress' power to regulate
immigration and citizenship is not enumerated in the
Constitution. Congress, however, has the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations,"33 and the Supreme Court has
used this language to invalidate state statutes attempting to
regulate immigration. 34 The express language of the Constitution
provided that, prior to 1808, Congress' power to prohibit the
"Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
CRIME RECORD, supra note 11 (stating Nguyen's home address).
27. See infra notes 30-146 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 147-182 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 183-248 and accompanying text.
30. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY
10 (3d ed. 2002) (stating that Congress' powers are limited).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
32. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 30, at 10 (stating that Congress' powers are
enumerated in the Constitution or are "necessary and proper" to execute the
enumerated powers).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34. See, e.g., Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 409-10 (1849) (relying on
Congress' power to regulate commerce with foreign nations to strike down New




now existing shall think proper to admit"35 was limited. Thus, this
clause has been read to imply that Congress has had the power to
prohibit migration and importation since 1808.36 Although
Congress has the power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization,"37  naturalization is not synonymous with
immigration, and the power has been criticized as a source of
federal immigration power.38
Even though the Supreme Court has not clearly decided
which enumerated power gives Congress the power to regulate
immigration, it has stated that the authority to admit and expel
aliens at Congress' discretion is "too clearly within the essential
attributes of sovereignty to be seriously contested." 39 Since then,
the Court has reaffirmed Congress' authority to regulate
citizenship and immigration under its plenary power, requiring
judicial deference to Congress in matters involving immigration. 40
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
36. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 30, at 12 (stating that it appears that "Congress
may prohibit (and, a fortiori, restrict) migration and importation after 1808").
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
38. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 30, at 12 (stating that naturalization is related
to a non-U.S. citizen's membership in a political community, whereas immigration
is related to a non-U.S. citizen's movement in and out of the United States).
Congress, however, has used its constitutional authority "[tlo establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization" to enact legislation requiring lawful admission as a
permanent resident before a non-U.S. citizen can qualify for naturalization. See 8
U.S.C. § 1427 (describing the eligibility requirements for naturalization).
39. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 607 (1889) (relying on
Congress' general power to regulate foreign affairs in upholding the
constitutionality of the Act of 1888 that prohibited Chinese laborers from re-
entering the United States even though they had secured permission to return
before the Act had passed).
40. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982) (noting that the
judiciary's role with respect to immigration is limited and does not extend to
displace congressional policy choices); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)
(stating that courts will not review policy decisions made by Congress while
exercising its power over immigration and naturalization even if it makes rules
that would be considered unacceptable if applied to citizens); Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953) (stating that where
respondent was denied entry into the United States without a hearing, the
"respondent's right to enter the United States depends on the congressional will,
and courts cannot substitute their judgment for the legislative mandate"), Oceanic
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) (stating that "over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over" the admission of aliens); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705
(1892) (recognizing that Congress may submit its decision to exclude aliens to
judicial review at its discretion); Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power
Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional
Constitutional Immigration Law, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 257 (2000) (stating
that the plenary power is construed to isolate immigrant classifications from
judicial review). But see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race
Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7
2002]
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The limits of federal immigration power are starting to be
tested, and so far there appear to be some regulations that
Congress is not permitted to enact and enforce upon aliens. The
Supreme Court in Fiallo v. Bell 4' stated that Congress' power was
"largely immune from judicial control," thus leaving open the
possibility that immigration provisions could be struck. 42 Courts
have stated that the plenary power doctrine may not apply to all
First Amendment challenges in a removal hearing. 43 Courts have
also invalidated various immigration-related statutes, previously
thought to be immune from judiciary review, on grounds that they
are unconstitutional. 44 The courts have recognized that Congress'
power to regulate immigration affairs is not completely immune to
judicial review. 45
B. Mothers and Fathers Are Treated Differently Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
U.S. citizenship laws combine two basic principles that confer
citizenship at the moment of birth.46 Jus sanguinis, meaning
"right of the blood"-also known as "citizenship by descent" or
"derivative citizenship"-grants citizenship to the children of a
(1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court treats immigration constitutional law
inconsistently with domestic constitutional law).
41. 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
42. Id. at 792; see generally ,Collin O'Connor Udell, Miller v. Albright. Plenary
Power, Equal Protection, and the Rights of an Alien Loue Child, 12 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 621 (1998) (examining the Miller decision in light of the continuing erosion of
the plenary power doctrine and the rise of gender-neutral jurisprudence, even in
the context of immigration law).
43. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491
(1999) (barring First Amendment claims in removal hearings except where the
prosecution reflects discrimination "so outrageous that the foregoing considerations
can be overcome").
44. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2505 (2001) (holding that an alien
may not be held in a detention center indeterminately where there is no real
likelihood of removal in the "reasonably foreseeable future," contrary to the INS'
practice of holding criminal aliens indeterminately past the ninety-day removal
period prescribed by statute); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) (striking
a federal statutory provision concerned with the expulsion of non-U.S. citizens and
stating that "[t]he plenary authority of Congress over aliens under [the
naturalization clause] is not open to question but what is challenged here is
whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of
implementing that power"); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976)
(striking a section of the INA based on the lack of equal protection of the laws
under the Fifth Amendment); Manwani v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 736 F. Supp. 1367,
1382 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (holding that a section of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Act violated due process).
45. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
46. LEGOMSKY, supra note 30, at 1193.
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country's existing citizens, regardless of where the child is born. 47
Literally translated "right of the land," jus soli grants citizenship
to people born within its territory. 48 The jus soli principle is
evident in the Fourteenth Amendment, which states: "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside."49
Congressional citizenship statutes enacted before 1934,
embodying the jus sanguinis principle, were strongly biased in
favor of the father, stating that foreign-born children of only U.S.
citizen fathers would be considered U.S. citizens. 50 Starting in
1940, Congress enacted citizenship statutes biased against the
father in an attempt to limit citizenship claims from those "who
would be a potential liability rather than an asset."51
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Citizenship laws in many countries,
particularly in the Middle East and in some Asian and African countries, tend to
favor fathers over mothers. See Joanne Mariner, Citizen Dad: An International
Perspective on the Supreme Court's Nguyen Case, FINDLAW'S LEGAL COMMENT.
(Jan. 11, 2001), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20010111.html. Some
countries do not grant citizenship to legitimate children born to citizen mothers and
foreign fathers, and other countries do not permit a mother to transfer citizenship
to her children at all. See id.
50. Pursuant to the first U.S. legislation on this matter, an alien child's
citizenship depended on his father's status in the United States. See Act of Mar.
26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (repealed 1795). The Act specifically stated:
[T]he children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond
seas, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as
natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not
descent to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United
States.
Id. Similarly, an act of 1855 said:
That all persons heretofore born, or hereafter born, out of the limits and
jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the
time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and
considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States:
Provided, however, That the rights of citizenship shall not descend to
persons whose fathers never resided in the United States.
Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604 (repealed 1940).
51. H.R. REP. NO. 76-2396, at 2 (1940) (introducing the bill known as the
Nationality Act of 1940). Congress was concerned about "young people, men for the
most part, who are on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries." See
Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2001) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., SELECTED
MANPOWER STATISTICS 48, 74 (1999) (reporting that in 1969, the year in which
Nguyen was born, there were 3,458,072 active duty military personnel, 39,506 of
whom were female); U.S. DEPVT OF DEF., SELECTED MANPOWER STATISTICS 29
(1970) (noting that 1,041,094 military personnel were stationed in foreign countries
in 1969); and U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., SELECTED MANPOWER STATISTICS 49, 76 (1999)
(reporting that in 1999 there were 1,385,703 active duty military personnel,
200,287 of whom were female and that 252,763 military personnel were stationed
2002]
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Currently, §§ 1401 and 1409 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code
govern citizenship requirements for children born to U.S. citizens
overseas. 52 Section 1401(g) provides that where a child is born
overseas to a non-U.S. citizen parent and a U.S. citizen parent, the
child may be deemed a U.S. citizen if the U.S. citizen parent meets
all of the listed requirements. 53 Under § 1401(g), the U.S. citizen
parent must have been physically present in the United States for
more than five years, at least two of which were after that parent
turned fourteen.54
The requirements in § 1409 impose an additional burden on
the U.S. citizen father of an illegitimate child born overseas. 55 He
in foreign countries in 1999)).
52. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2000). Sections 1402 to 1408 apply to children born
in a noncontiguous U.S. state such as Hawaii and to children born in U.S.
territories such as Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1402-1408
(2000).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g). Section 1401(g) states:
The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at
birth...
(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and
its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a
citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was
physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a
period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which
were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods
of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States, or periods of
employment with the United States Government or with an international
organization.., by such citizen parent, or any periods during which such
citizen parent is physically present abroad as the dependent unmarried
son or daughter and a member of the household of a person (A) honorably
serving with the Armed Forces of the United States, or (B) employed by
the United States Government or an international organization . . . may be




55. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2000). Section 1409 states:
(a) The provisions of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (g) of section 1401 of this
title, and of paragraph (2) of section 1408 of this title, shall apply as of the
date of birth to a person born out of wedlock if-
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established
by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the
person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial
support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years-
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or
domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath,
or




must prove his blood relationship with the child by clear and
convincing evidence, 56 have had U.S. citizenship at the time the
child was born,57 have agreed in writing to provide financial
support to the child, 58 and legitimate the child before the child is
eighteen years old by performing one of three acts: legitimate the
child under the laws recognized under that jurisdiction,
acknowledge paternity in writing under oath, or establish
paternity by adjudication in court. 59 In contrast, the mother of an
illegitimate child born overseas is specifically exempt from these
requirements under § 1409(c), and as such, a child born out of
wedlock to a U.S. citizen mother acquires citizenship at birth,
provided the mother had U.S. citizenship at the time of the birth
and had been in the United States for a continuous period of one
year before the birth.60
The Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of § 1409
in Miller v. Albright.61 Lorelyn Penero Miller (Miller) was born
out of wedlock in the Philippines to a Filipino mother and a U.S.
citizen father. 62 Miller's father was a member of the U.S. military
stationed in the Philippines at the time of Miller's conception. 63
He apparently did not know of his daughter's existence until she
was twenty-one years old. 64 Miller's father filed a request for a
Voluntary Paternity Decree declaring him as her biological
father.65 The Texas court granted Miller's father the decree,
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 405 of this Act, the provisions
of section 140 1(g) of this title shall apply to a child born out of wedlock on
or after January 13, 1941, and before December 24, 1952, as of the date of
birth, if the paternity of such child is established at any time while such
child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation.
(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a person
born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of
wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his
mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time
of such person's birth, and if the mother had previously been physically
present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a
continuous period of one year.
Id.
56. See id. § 1409(a)(1).
57. See id. § 1409(a)(2).
58. See id. § 1409(a)(3).
59. See id. § 1409(a)(4).
60. See id. § 1409(c).
61. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
62. See id. at 425.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 426. A voluntary paternity decree is the equivalent of legal
recognition of paternity. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF TEX., WHAT
DOES ESTABLISHING LEGAL FATHERHOOD MEAN TO YOUR CHILD?, at
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finding him "to be the biological and legal father of Lorelyn Penero
Miller."66 Miller then filed an application for registration and
documentation as a U.S. citizen.67 The State Department denied
her citizenship application, citing her father's failure to meet the
legitimation requirement of § 1409(a).68 Miller appealed the
denial of her application, but the Office of Citizen Consular
Services of the State Department upheld its original decision.69
Miller and her father sought a judgment in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas declaring Miller to
be a U.S. citizen.70 They challenged § 1409 on the basis that it
violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.7'
After dismissing Mr. Miller as a party, the court moved the case to
the District Court for the District of Columbia. 72 The district
court, however, stated that because the legitimation requirements
of § 1409(a) had not been satisfied, it was unable to confer
citizenship.73 It further stated that even if § 1409 did violate the
equal protection requirement, the court lacked the power to grant
citizenship because "only Congress has the power to confer
citizenship to persons not constitutionally entitled to
citizenship." 74 Miller appealed the district court's decision to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 75
The court of appeals, citing Fiallo v. Bell,76 held that the
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/child/why.htm (last revised July 1999). The father is
held responsible for the monetary support of the child according to each state's
child support guidelines and has the right to legal and enforceable visitation. See
id. In Texas, paternity may be established using a blood test. See id.
66. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at 425 (quoting the trial court's decree).
67. See id. at 426.
68. See id. (quoting a letter sent by the State Department rejecting Miller's
application for registration as a U.S. citizen, which said: "Without such
legitimation before age eighteen, there is no legally recognized relationship under
the INA and the child acquires no rights of citizenship through an American citizen
parent").
69. See Miller v. Christopher, 870 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1994).
70. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at 426.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Miller v. Christopher, 870 F. Supp. at 2.
74. Id. at 3.
75. See Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom.
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia heard the appeal because the Texas district court granted the
government's motion to transfer venue to the District of Columbia. See
Christopher, 870 F. Supp. at 1.
76. 430 U.S. 787 (1977). Fiallo addressed the issue of whether an alien
illegitimate child or an alien unwed biological father of a non-alien child could
receive special immigration preference by virtue of a relationship to a U.S. citizen
or permanent resident alien child or parent under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1)(D) and
[Vol. 20:275
NGUYEN V. INS
additional requirements imposed on the illegitimate children of a
U.S. citizen father did not violate the equal protection
requirement.7 7 Fiallo involved a different section of the INA that
distinguished alien children on the basis of their legitimacy and
the U.S. citizen parent's gender. 78 Taking a deferential stance
towards Congress, the Miller court stated that "a mother is far less
likely to ignore the child she has carried in her womb than is the
natural father, who may not even be aware of its existence." 79
Miller petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted by the
Supreme Court.8 0
The Supreme Court's decision was splintered, but Miller's
challenge to § 1409(a) failed by a six-to-three vote.8 ' The Court
affirmed the court of appeals' decision on three distinctly different
grounds, yielding a result without a majority opinion.8 2 Justice
Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist affirmed the court of appeals'
opinion,8 3 basing their reasoning on the important and real
difference inherent in the birthing event. Because of this
difference, the mother's legal relationship is established by the
birth itself, while the father's legal relationship is dependent on
his post-birth conduct.8 4 Justice Kennedy joined Justice O'Connor
(b)(2). Id. at 789. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), 1151(b), and 1181(a)(1) (2000) give special
immigration status to those who satisfy the statutory "parent-child" relationship.
Id. A "child" as defined under the INA is an unmarried person under the age of
twenty-one who is a legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild or adopted child, or
an illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his or her relationship with his
or her natural mother. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2000). The definition of a "parent"
depends on the person's relationship with the "child" as defined under the INA. Id.
77. See Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d at 1471.
78. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 797.
79. Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d at 1472.
80. See Miller v. Albright, 520 U.S. 1208 (1997) (granting certiorari to resolve
whether the legitimation requirements under § 1409(a) represented an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection based on the gender of the parent).
81. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 420 (1998).
82. See id. at 420. Where there is no clear majority, the case's value as
precedent rests on the narrowest grounds upon which there is a majority of votes.
See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the
Canon of Constitutional Law (Symposium: The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law), 17
CONST. COMMENT. 321, 326 (2000) (quoting Marks v. United States: "When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds ... "' (internal citations omitted)).
83. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at 423-46. In distinguishing Miller from
Fiallo, Justice Stevens noted Miller involved a challenge related to citizenship,
while Fiallo was concerned with claims of alienship for special immigration
preference. See id. at 429.
84. See id. at 436. In a case decided fifteen years before Miller, Justice Stevens
argued that differences in parental involvement originated in biological differences.
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in deciding that Miller only had standing to bring claims on her
own behalf and thus could not bring the issue of whether her
father's equal protection rights had been violated. 85 O'Connor
stated that Miller's claim would only receive rational basis
scrutiny because § 1409(a) did not have a gender classification
with respect to the child.8 6 According to O'Connor, the statute
survived rational basis scrutiny.87 Justices Scalia and Thomas
concurred in the final result but based their decision on the
Court's inability to confer citizenship without authority provided
by Congress. 88
Subsequent to the Miller decision, Congress enacted the
Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA).89 The CCA lays out the
scenarios in which a child born outside of the United States
automatically becomes a U.S. citizen.90 It was enacted in response
to the number of stories of long-term permanent residents adopted
by U.S. citizens who faced removal because they never became
citizens. 91  The parents who adopted children from abroad
assumed that the children were automatically made citizens
during the adoption process and never legitimated them.92
Although the CCA applies equally to both biological and adopted
children and makes no reference to marital status requirements,
See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983). He stated that the man has
no commitment to a fetus or baby compared to the woman who must commit to the
fetus when she chooses to carry the pregnancy to term. See Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 399 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He also commented that the
woman is necessarily at the birth of the baby, and a father may not be present. See
id. See also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (denying a challenge by
four pregnant women to a provision of California's disability insurance program,
based on the premise that pregnancy distinguishes men from women and therefore
the law does not need to treat them identically).
85. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at 446-52.
86. See id. at 451.
87. See id. at 452. Justice O'Connor stated that even though Justice Stevens'
justifications were insufficient under the heightened scrutiny he applied, the
justifications he submitted passed rational basis scrutiny. See id. at 451-52. She
stated: "It is unlikely.., that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can
survive heightened scrutiny, but under rational scrutiny, a statute may be
defended based on generalized classifications unsupported by empirical evidence."
Id. at 452.
88. See id. at 452-59. Justices Scalia and Thomas expressed extreme deference
to Congress' plenary power over immigration issues, stating that "it makes no
difference whether or not § 1409(a) passes 'heightened scrutiny' or any other test
Members of the Court might choose to apply." Id. at 452-53.
89. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1431 (2000).
90. See id.
91. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (Feb.
26, 2001), http://travel.state.gov/childcit.html.
92. See Ballentine, supra note 24.
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the regulation implementing the Act is phrased narrowly that it
effectively denies benefits of U.S. citizenship to many children
born out of wedlock.93
C. The Trend in Domestic Laws Is to Treat Mothers and
Fathers Equally
During the colonial period in the United States, a father
generally had preferred rights to his children. 94 But during the
industrialization period, when the father's work took him out of
the home and into a physically separate workplace, paternal
preference was replaced by the "tender years doctrine 95 and the
"best interests of the child"96 principle. Mothers increasingly came
93. See id. Aliens are a politically powerless group of people, thus regulations
affecting them have triggered heightened scrutiny. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The
Protection of Aliens from Discrininatoly Treatment by the National Government,
1977 SuP. CT. REV. 275, 309-10. Rosberg explains:
Given the exclusion of aliens from the political process, it is ... reasonable
for the Court to demand a special showing from the state if it is to classify
on the basis of alienage .... Since the legislature has denied aliens any
chance to assert their own interests in the political forum, it cannot expect
the courts to maintain their usual deference to the legislature's balancing
of the interests.
Id. Legislative reform requires lobbying by groups and politicians to support them.
See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LOBBYING OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION, at
http://www.aclu.org/congress/overview.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002); AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, HOW TO LOBBY YOUR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, at
http://www.aclu.org/congress/howtolobby.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002);
NETWORK, A NATIONAL CATHOLIC SOCIAL JUSTICE LOBBY, WHAT YOU CAN Do
(providing background and advice to citizens regarding how to lobby their
congressmen and representatives to address their concerns), at
http://www.networklobby.org/page5.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002). The lack of
political power on the part of illegitimate children is evidenced by the exclusion of
illegitimate children from the CCA. The lack of legislative action favoring
illegitimate children born overseas also indicates Congress' lack of interest in the
matter even after a 1982 report from the Attorney General calling § 1409 a federal
statute "needlessly providing for inequitable treatment of the sexes," and requiring
corrective action by Congress. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON
WOMEN'S EQUALITY, 128 CONG. REC. H5369, 5376 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1982).
Although some groups lobby for immigrants' rights, not surprisingly, the emphasis
of such lobbying efforts tends to be on those immigrants who have not been found
guilty of criminal conduct. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IMMIGRANTS'
RIGHTS, at http://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrantlhmir.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2002).
94. See JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE §§ 525-551 (5th ed. 1873). Fathers were viewed as role models to children
and were frequently given preference in situations that required a choice between
the mother's and the father's raising methods. See id.
95. The "tender years" doctrine was a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
mother that was used in evaluating the best interests of the child. See CATHARINE
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 625 (2001).
96. The "best interest" principle requires that "when the child's welfare seems
to conflict with the claims of one or both parents, the child's welfare must prevail."
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to be perceived as having the special skill of caring for children.97
It is disputed whether the framers intended for men and
women to have equal protection under the laws.98 But since then,
the Equal Protection Clause has been used to strike down various
statutes providing dissimilar treatment for similarly situated men
and women. 99 The Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed used only the
rational basis standard of review to strike down a statute giving
preference to men over women to serve as intestate estate
administrators. 10 0 In Frontiero v. Richardson, however, the Court
applied the strict scrutiny standard of review to invalidate a
statute that offered differing benefits to the dependents of male
and female members of the armed forces. 1 1 Since Frontiero,
however, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
generally only required the government to satisfy the intermediate
scrutiny standard when evaluating statutes that treat similarly
situated males and females differently. 102
Id.
97. See id.
98. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 9.4.1 (1997); see, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a state
law prohibiting women from bartending unless the woman was the wife or
daughter of the bar owner).
99. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 98, at § 9.4.1 (stating that regardless of the
framers' intentions regarding the scope of equal protection, the Supreme Court has
expanded the list of suspect and quasi-suspect classifications to include those based
on gender); see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (striking down a
statute that prohibited the sale of beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to
females under the age of eighteen); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91
(1973) (striking down a statute that gave dependents of male military members
greater access to benefits compared to dependents of female military members);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (holding a statute establishing a preference for
male administrators of intestate estates unconstitutional). But see Nikki
Ahrenholz, Miller v. Albright- Continuing to Discriminate on the Basis of Gender
and Illegitimacy, 76 DENy. U. L. REV. 281, 281 (1998) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's Miller ruling and describing how the INA discriminates against illegitimate
children); Dennis G. Vatsis, THROWAWAY DADS Making the Case for Fathers:
Gender Bias Denies Dads Custody When Parents Divorce, 80 MICH. B.J. 55, 56
(2001) (stating that a strong gender bias against fathers still exists in Michigan's
child custody determinations and suggesting various methods by which gender-
biased decisions can be avoided).
100. 404 U.S. at 71 (prohibiting mandatory preference to members of either sex
and holding that statute giving preference to male estate administrators over
female estate administrators is unconstitutional).
101. 411 U.S. at 677 (applying strict scrutiny and striking a military benefits
law that permitted a male military member to claim his spouse as a dependent,
whereas a female military member had to show that her spouse was in fact
dependent on her for over half of his support).
102. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Eng'g
Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 907 (11th
Cir. 1997) (requiring important governmental interest using substantially related
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Twenty-three years after the Court applied strict scrutiny to
a gender-based classification in Frontiero, the Supreme Court
articulated a new "exceedingly persuasive" intermediate scrutiny
standard of review in United States v. Virginia.0 3  Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the majority, stated that the government's
justification for the gender classification must be "exceedingly
persuasive,"'1 4 and that the State had to show "at least that the
[challenged] classification serve[d] 'important governmental
objectives' and that the discriminatory means employed"' 05 were
"substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."'10 6
The justifications offered "must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to htigation."'0 7 She added that the
statute could not rely on overbroad generalizations about the
differing talents, capacities or preferences of males and females. 108
Congress and state legislatures have also enacted anti-sex
discrimination laws equalizing the status and power of men and
women. 0 9 Colorado, for example, permits an illegitimate child to
means); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995)
(using strict scrutiny to evaluate equal protection of a race-conscious government
program). Traditionally, strict scrutiny has been used to "smoke out" pretexts and
hidden discrimination. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989) ('[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool."). Hypothetical justifications offered at the
time of trial, permitted when applying rational basis scrutiny, are not permitted
under intermediate scrutiny. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
103. 518 U.S. at 533 ("The State must show 'at least that the [challenged]
classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."'
(quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))).
104. Id. Courts initially interpreted the "exceedingly persuasive" requirement as
demanding a standard higher than intermediate scrutiny. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 75 (1996) (concluding
that Virginia's "exceedingly persuasive" justification requirement effectively
heightened the standard of review for gender classifications from intermediate to
strict scrutiny); Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla., Inc., 122 F.3d at 907 (concluding
that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to gender classifications despite
confusion as to whether Virginia heightened or simply reiterated the gender
classification standard of review). But see Pherabe Kolb, Reaching for the Silver
Lining: Constructing a Nonremedial yet "Exceedingly Persuasive" Rationale for
Single-Sex Educational Progranms in Public Schools, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 367, 375-76
(2001) (arguing that the standard of review was not heightened but simply
delineated, making it easier for educators to defend gender-specific educational
programs).




109. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000)
(equalizing the status of men and women by prohibiting employment
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inherit from the father once paternity is established even without
the father's voluntary participation. 10 It does this in order to
shield illegitimate children from the exigencies of parental
behavior (or non-behavior)."' In addition, many states have
enacted custody and adoption statutes treating male and female
parents equally. 112
D. The Changing Sociological and Legal Definitions of
"Mother" and "Father"
The sociological and legal definitions of "mother" and "father"
are changing.11 3 The rise in non-marital birth rates, 1 4 divorce
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin); see also
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 319, 319 (1993) (describing ways in which gender discrimination has been
eliminated).
110. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-114 (2001) (providing methods for
establishing a legal parent-child relationship for intestate purposes).
111. See id.
112. See, e.g., Alabama Uniform Parentage Act, ALA. CODE § 26-17 (2001)
(adopting the Uniform Parentage Act); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A.
299 (2000) (providing guidelines for states' parentage statutes as approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform Laws). In Caban v. Mohammed,
an unwed father challenged a New York statute that allowed unwed mothers to
block adoption of their children but permitted unwed fathers to block adoption of
their children only if the adoption violated the "best interests of the child." 441
U.S. 380, 387 (1979). The state argued that the statute was beneficial to the child's
interest in being adopted (i.e., legitimated) since the biological fathers were not
often found or did not claim them. See id. at 388. The Supreme Court invalidated
the statute and eliminated the statutory preference given to natural unwed
mothers over unwed fathers where the father is biologically related and had a
continuous relationship with the child. See id. at 394.
113. See Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L. REV. 943, 945
(2001) (arguing that the nuclear family model is no longer workable and that it
must be redefined in the context of immigration law); Ryiah Lilith, The G.I.F.T. of
Two Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. PoLy & L. 207, 208-11
(2001) (arguing the possibility, in cases where a lesbian couple conceives a child
through zygote intrafallopian transfer or gamete intrafallopian transfer, of having
two "mothers": the genetic mother and the gestational mother); Dawn Wenk,
Belsito v. Clark: Ohio's Battle with "Motherhood," 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 247, 277
(1996) (arguing that an Ohio court's decision that genetic contribution is
determinative of a child's natural and legal mother applies in the limited situation
where a gestational surrogate does not intend to retain custody of the child); Janet
L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of the
Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 542-46 (2000) (presenting the idea of a
"genetic family" wherein the family, mother, and father are defined through tests
and diagnoses).
114. During the past half-century, non-marital birth rates have increased more
than 400%. See Battle Robinson & Susan Paikin, Who is Daddy? A Case for the
Uniform Parentage Act (2000), 19 DEL. LAW. 23, 23 (2001) (citing DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. (PHS) 95-1931, BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED MOTHERS:
UNITED STATES, 1980-92, (1996) and DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB.
No. (PHS) 96-1120, ADVANCE REPORT OF FINAL NATALITY STATISTICS, 1994 (1996)).
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rates,11 5 and numbers of families that include children from
surrogacy n 6 and/or adoption 17 have eroded the "nuclear family
model,"' 18 the idealized version of the traditional family." 9
Additionally, single fathers 20 and homosexual parents' 2' do not fit
115. See Jason Fields & Lynne M. Casper, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, No. P20-537, AMERIcA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2000
(June 2001) (reporting the statistics of different family households), at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf.
116. More couples are choosing to have children using alternative reproductive
technology because of its increasing success rates. See Audra Elizabeth Laabs,
Lesbian ART, 19 LAW & INEQ. 65, 67 (2001) (stating that an increasing number of
lesbian women are choosing to have children using alternative reproductive
technologies); JOSEPH D. SCHULMAN, GENETICS & IVF INST., "WHAT'S YOUR
SUCCESS RATE?': UNDERSTANDING IVF PREGNANCY STATISTICS: PART I, at
http://www.givf.com/success.cfn (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
117. Courts have permitted nontraditional families to adopt children. See Karla
J. Starr, Adoption by Homosexuals: A Look at Differing State Court Opinions, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 1497, 1497 (1998) (giving examples of cases where homosexual
partners have been allowed to adopt children); In re Adoption of Minor T, 17 FAM.
L. REP. 1523 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1991) (permitting a lesbian mother to adopt the child
born to her partner).
118. See Kelly, supra note 113, at 945 (stating that in practice and in theory,
"the 'tradition' of the nuclear family ideal of two parents and dependent children
living as a unit has broken down"); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood
as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the
Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 880-81 (1984) (discussing
nonexclusive parenthood as a method of approaching certain child custody disputes
in which a critical premise of child custody law that parents raise their own
children in nuclear families is no longer fair because of the development of parent-
child relationships outside of a nuclear family). The number of single-mother
families increased from three million in 1970 to ten million in 2000, and the
number of single-father families grew from 393,000 in 1970 to two million in 2000.
See Fields & Casper, supra note 115, at 7.
119. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the
Family in Anerican Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 388 (stating that in
our society, the nuclear family is the "one form of intimate entity [that] has been so
venerated in the culture as to become institutionalized as the model or archetype of
intimacy"). But see Kelly, supra note 113, at 947-61 (stating that the "nuclear
family fiction is perpetuated in the law").
120. According to 1998 U.S. Census data, there were 3,143,000 children under
age eighteen living with their father, of whom only 2,566,000 lived with a father
who was widowed, divorced, or had never been married. See TERRY A. LUGAILA,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS iii (1998).
121. The number of homosexual parents and the number of children they have
raised have increased dramatically. See Lilith, supra note 113, at 208. In 1987,
three million homosexual people in the United States raised between eight and ten
million children. See id. In 1998, six to ten million homosexual people raised
approximately fourteen million children. See id. Homosexual parents can adopt
children or conceive their own using processes such as gamete intrafallopian
transfer ("G.I.F.T."). See id. at 209. G.I.F.T. involves removing an egg from one
woman and injecting the ova along with semen containing fertile sperm into the
uterus of the second woman. See id.
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the traditional framework. 122
Furthermore, because the law recognizes both biological and
social aspects of the family, the legal definition of "mother" has
been affected by new reproductive technologies. 123 The advent of
surrogate mothers 124 as an option for women who are unable or
who choose not to give birth has created a new variety of issues
regarding the definition of "mother."' 25  There are two types of
surrogate parenting: artificial insemination and in vitro
fertilization. 126 With artificial insemination, the resultant baby
has a biological mother and an adoptive mother. 27 With in vitro
122. See Laabs, supra note 116, at 65-66 (stating that the decrease in popularity
of the traditional family structure has been accompanied by an increase of
"nonfamilies" and other types of families, such as non-married heterosexual and
homosexual partners living together and "lesbian- and gay-parented families").
123. See Michelle Pierce-Gealy, "Are You My Mother?" Ohio's Crazy-Making
Baby-Making Produces a New Definition of "Mother," 28 AKRON L. REV. 535, 539
(1995) (advocating a new "parentage paradigm" because the advent of alternative
reproductive technologies has led to a situation where the woman giving birth to a
child is not necessarily the legal mother). New alternative reproductive
technologies include surrogacy, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and
embryo transfers. See Andrea E. Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for
New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 187 (1986) (providing a
background to the alternative reproductive methods available). Services exist
throughout the United States to assist childless couples to find surrogate parents.
See Barbara Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It?, 10 AM. J. L. & MED.
243, 243-44 (1984). There are also websites offering advice and information
regarding surrogacy. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN SURROGACY CENTER (providing
information and services regarding surrogacy contracts and laws), at
http://www.surrogacy.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
124. A surrogate gives birth to another couple's baby by being impregnated with
the male's sperm, carrying the baby to term, and then giving up her parental right
to enable the adoption of the child. See Joanna K. Budde, Surrogate Parenting:
Future Legislation to Eliminate Present Inconsistencies, 26 DUQ. L. REV. 633, 634
(1988). In order for the child to be adoptable by the couple that made the
arrangement with the surrogate, the surrogate is required to give up her rights to
the child because she is biologically related to the child. See id. The resulting child
would be the product of the surrogate mother's egg and the couple's sperm. See id.
125. See generally Stumpf, supra note 123, at 187 (stating that surrogacy, along
with other reproductive technologies, has challenged the presumption that the
mother "was the one from whose womb the child came"); Pierce-Gealy, supra note
123, at 562-69 (discussing problems involved with adopting a strict definition of
mother based on genetic relationship and arguing that the gestational mother's
contributions and rights should be recognized).
126. See Budde, supra note 124, at 634 (describing three types of surrogate
parenting but noting that the second and third are virtually the same). In vitro
fertilization involves taking the egg and sperm of the couple and fertilizing the egg
in a laboratory dish. See id. at 635. The fertilized egg is then implanted in the
surrogate. See id.
127. Occasionally issues arise in surrogate arrangements where surrogates have
a change of heart and decide to keep the baby, but many of these issues are
addressed preemptively by signing agreements before the surrogacy process begins.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1982) (relying on the
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fertilization, the baby has a biological mother and a gestational
mother. 128 Each "mother" in these situations plays a different role,
and neither satisfies the stereotypical definition of "mother."'129
Where the surrogate has no genetic tie to the baby, courts have
held that it is permissible to eliminate entirely the surrogate's
name from the birth certificate. 130
Also, more and more courts are recognizing the legal rights of
homosexual parents. 131 Currently, an increasing number of gay
couples are raising children, 132 and more single fathers are raising
children than in the past. Courts are rejecting concerns based on
gay stereotypes and are granting an increasing number of parental
rights to gay fathers. 133 Gay men in California can become sole
parents of children born of a surrogate who is implanted with a
donated egg fertilized by the gay father's sperm. 3 4 Many states
permit "second-parent adoptions" in which an unmarried couple-
agreement signed by both genetic and surrogate mothers to determine the
intentions of the parties).
128. A gestational mother is the surrogate who has no biological or physical ties
to the baby other than carrying the baby to term. See Budde, supra note 124, at
634.
129. See Pierce-Gealy, supra note 123, at 562-71 (arguing that Ohio's grant of
legal title of "mother" to the genetic mother is unjustified because the role of the
genetic mother during the child's gestation is that of simply financially supporting
the unborn child while the role of the gestational mother involves physical,
emotional, and legal liability).
130. See, e.g., Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 768 (Ohio C.P. 1994) (holding
that the genetic contributors of the baby carried by a surrogate are the legal
parents and that their names belong on the birth certificate). The establishment of
a mother-child relationship depends on the documentation of the birth certificate or
the testimony of a witness regarding the identity of the person who gave birth. See
id. at 763. These factors are often inaccurate where a surrogate mother is involved.
See id.
131. See, e.g., J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(granting standing to a former lesbian life partner to petition for partial custody of
a child born to her partner, via artificial insemination, during relationship).
132. See Jim Hill, Gay Couples Use Surrogates to Help Grow Families, CNN.COM
(Aug. 2, 1998), at http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/02/gay.surrogacy.
133. See, e.g., Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 678-79 (Md. 1998) (requiring
child custody decisions to be made on the basis of individualized determinations
regarding the child's best interests and not on blanket stereotypes about likely
harm caused by the presence of the father's gay partner); In re Marriage of
Wicklund, 932 P.2d 652, 655 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (determining that the trial
court abused its discretion by conditioning the gay father's parental rights on a
requirement that he not practice homosexuality "in the sense of exhibiting, or
participating in displays of affection (hand-holding, kissing, etc.) with a partner" in
the presence of his children (quoting trial court decree)).
134. See THOMAS M. PINKERTON, SURROGACY AND EGG DONATION UNDER
CALIFORNIA LAW (providing summaries of California surrogacy laws and discussing
generally surrogacy client experiences), at
http://www.surrogacylaw.net/currentlaws.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
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heterosexual or homosexual-can adopt a child provided the "best
interests of the child" are met. 35 Thus, although not all states
provide the same progressive legal rights to homosexual partners
as California or New York, there is a definite trend that shows
homosexual parents gaining more legal rights than they have held
previously.
E. The Increasing Use of DNA Test Results in Determining
Paternity
Historically, courts have relied on various forms of evidence
to determine paternity. 136  Although slow and initially
apprehensive in adopting new technologies, some courts, together
with legislatures, have kept up with advancements in science and
tests yielding more accurate paternity results. 137  Currently,
conventional blood testing 138 is used routinely in immigration
proceedings 139 and to resolve paternity disputes. 140
In the last three decades, paternity testing has undergone
tremendous scientific advances.14 ' Genetic DNA tests142 evidence
135. See Starr, supra note 117, at 1497 (discussing various cases in which courts
have permitted same-sex partners to adopt children); see, e.g., In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d 397, 400 (N.Y. 1995) (extending the step-parent adoption to the adoption of
a child by a lesbian couple); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 998-99 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that adoption by two loving mothers that had a loving
relationship would serve the-child's best interests).
136. Paternity used to be determined by rudimentary comparisons of physical
markers such as extra digits on the hand of the child and putative father or by
calculations of the date of conception. See Allan Z. Litovsky & Kirsten Schultz,
Scientific Evidence of Paternity. A Survey of State Statutes, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 79,
79 (1998).
137. See id. State courts admit blood test results into evidence where statutes
have authorized them to use these tests to determine a child's parentage. See Alan
R. Davis, Are You My Mother? The Scientific and Legal Validity of Conventional
Blood Testing and DNA Fingerprinting to Establish Proof of Parentage in
Immigration Cases, 1994 BYU L. REV. 129, 134 (1994). In some jurisdictions,
genetic evidence has been introduced by judicial action. See Litovsky & Schultz,
supra note 136, at 82-83.
138. "Blood testing" is a comparison of the blood group of the putative parent
with that of the child. See Davis, supra note 137, at 131.
139. To grant a visa under the immediate family exemption, the naturalized
citizen must be the parent or child of the visa applicant. See id. at 130-31.
Occasionally, a blood test is used to determine whether the applicant is a child or
parent of the naturalized citizen in order to determine whether a visa should be
granted. See id. at 131.
140. See id. at 133. Blood testing is relied on as an indicator of non-parentage
and is used as supporting testimonial and documentary evidence that a parent-
child relationship does exist. See id. at 134.
141. See, e.g., id. at 129 (discussing recent changes).
142. All genetic information passed on from a parent to a child is contained in
DNA molecules. See id. at 136. DNA is unique to the individual, its structure
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paternity with more than ninety-nine percent accuracy.1 43 DNA
testing results are now routinely admitted into evidence in
paternity cases. 144  The use of DNA testing in immigration
proceedings is also gaining support. 145 Moreover, DNA evidence is
remains unchanged throughout a person's life, and its structure is constant from
cell to cell. See id. A DNA molecule is long and is comprised of pairs of molecules
called "base pairs." See id. at 137. The particular sequence in which the base pairs
are arranged contains the information necessary to form the human body. See id.
Though most of the structure and sequences on the DNA molecule are identical
from person to person, there are sections of the DNA code that are unique to the
individual. See id. It is these unique sections that are used to determine the "DNA
fingerprint." See id. DNA is analyzed by looking at the unique sections of the
putative parent's DNA and the child's DNA. See id. The strength of similarities
between the parent and child's DNA indicates the likelihood of parentage. See id.
See generally Randi B. Weiss et al., The Use of Genetic Testing in the Courtroom, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 889 (1999) (presenting an overview of testing techniques and
their reliability).
143. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Scientific Testing and Proof of Paternity, 57
LA. L. REV. 379, 388 (1997) (describing how to calculate paternity test accuracy and
stating that by the late 1980s, DNA testing provided probabilities greater than
ninety-nine percent). The accuracy of current DNA test results and related
technologies are widely accepted. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
114 (1989) (relying on a genetic test that showed "98.07% probability that
[appellant] was Victoria's father"); In re Estate of Lukas, 508 N.E.2d 368, 372-73
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (considering experts' testimonies that there was a 98.9%
probability and a 97.36% probability that the boy claiming to be an heir was the
decedent's son); State ex rel. Williams v. Williams, 609 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980) (relying on a genetic test in finding that there was a "81.15% possibility
that [the defendant] was the father"); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON
DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992); David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence:
Probability, Population Genetics, and the Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101 (1993);
D. H. Kaye & Ronald Kanwischer, The Admissibility of Genetic Testing in
Parentage Litigation: A Survey of State Statutes, 22 FAM. L.Q. 109 (1988); Davis,
supra note 137, at 134; Litovsky & Schultz, supra note 136, at 80; Thomas M.
Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of DNA Identification Evidence, 84 A.L.R. 4TH
313 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
144. See Litovsky & Schultz, supra note 136, at 83. States have enacted statutes
adopting this new technology. See Davis, supra note 137, at 129. For a summary of
the various jurisdictional statute information regarding admissibility of scientific
paternity tests, see Litovsky & Schultz, supra note 136, at 79. As of 1998, thirty-
nine states specifically allow the admission of blood test results that are
statistically less accurate than DNA tests, and sixteen specifically allow the
admission of DNA test results. See id. at 86. The Supreme Court has struck down
a series of state statutes that barred illegitimate children from establishing their
parentage. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 458 (1988) (stating that "blood
tests... showed a 99.3% probability that Jeter is Tiffany's father"); Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98 n.4 (1982) (stating that "recent developments ... have
sought ... to predict paternity with a high degree of probability" although "their
evidentiary weight" is a "matter of academic dispute"). But see Michael H., 491
U.S. at 112 (refusing to admit evidence of a 98.07% probability of paternity of one
man to rebut a presumption of paternity of another).
145. DNA tests are not widely used to resolve immigration cases, but there are
particular cases in which DNA evidence was admitted into evidence. See Davis,
supra note 137, at 136 (describing the case of Johnny A-Lo Hoang, a U.S. citizen,
who, in order to obtain an immediate family visa for his father, proved his
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used frequently in criminal hearings to inculpate and exculpate
defendants.146
II. Nguyen v. INS: The Court's Interpretation
After Tuan Anh Nguyen pled guilty to two felony charges, the
INS began removal proceedings against him. 147 The INS charged
that he was subject to removal as an alien under 8 U.S.C. §§
1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii)148 because he had been convicted of two
crimes involving moral turpitude149 and an aggravated felony. 150
On January 30, 1997, the immigration judge ordered Nguyen to be
removed to Vietnam.' 5' Nguyen appealed the order to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) arguing that he was a U.S. citizen
under 8 U.S.C. § 1409 and therefore not subject to removal 152
Boulais filed a paternity suit in a Texas district court while
Nguyen's appeal to the BIA was pending. 153 The state court
granted Boulais an order of parentage based on his DNA test
results indicating that he was Nguyen's father. 154 Even after
receiving this evidence of paternity, the BIA dismissed Nguyen's
relationship with his father using a DNA test).
146. See Weiss et al., supra note 142, at 906 (stating that several federal courts
and state courts have addressed the admissibility of DNA testing to prove guilt or
innocence and have generally accepted the procedures and principles as sufficiently
valid to permit the admission of DNA test results as evidence). Andrews v. State
was the first reported appellate discussion of using DNA testing to prove identity.
See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In Andrews,
DNA from a semen sample obtained from a rape victim was compared to the DNA
from a blood sample obtained from the alleged rapist. Id. at 842-43. An expert
testified that the two samples exhibited identical banding that had a one in
839,914,540 chance of occurring. See id. at 843. The court accepted the evidence
because DNA testing was based on widely recognized, proven scientific principles.
See id. at 850-57.
147. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2057 (2001). The INS generally begins
removal proceedings while the alien is serving his or her sentence to ensure that
the order of removal is prepared by the time of the alien's release. See
WEISSBRODT, supra note 7, at 215.
148. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057. See Lawyers' Coop. Publ'g Co., supra note
13, at 483 (discussing removability of aliens for crimes involving moral turpitude).
149. See supra note 13 (defining a crime of moral turpitude).
150. See supra note 13 (noting that aliens have been deported for criminal
convictions other than those involving moral turpitude).
151. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057.
152. See id. Nguyen later admitted that he was a citizen of Vietnam and was a
permanent resident of the United States. Brief for Respondent at 5, Nguyen v.
INS, 2000 WL 1868100 (2001) (No. 99-2071).
153. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057.
154. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 7. The DNA test showed to a
99.98% certainty that Boulais was in fact Nguyen's father. See id. Texas permits




appeal and claim of U.S. citizenship because a DNA test
evidencing paternity is not one of the methods by which
citizenship can be gained after a child reaches the age of
eighteen. 155 Boulais and Nguyen petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a
review of the Board's ruling.156
The Fifth Circuit ruled on the petition for review, holding
that §§ 1409(a)(3) and (4) survive heightened constitutional
scrutiny. 157 The court of appeals followed the plurality opinion in
Miller, stating that § 1409 was "well tailored" to meet "several
important governmental objectives."'158 The court decided that
because Boulais did not meet § 1409's requirements to establish
Nguyen's citizenship at birth, Nguyen was an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony. 159 Thus, the court of appeals granted the INS's
motion to dismiss the petition for review. 160
The Supreme Court granted Boulais and Nguyen's petition
for certiorari. 161 The Court applied intermediate scrutiny because
the lower court had made a gender classification with respect to
the parent. 162 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, emphasized
the importance of the "real difference" between men and women: a
woman, by the act of giving birth, cannot avoid being identified as
the mother of the child.'6 3
The Court accepted the existence of a biological parent-child
relationship and some demonstrated opportunity for the child and
parent to develop real, everyday ties with each other and with the
United States as the important governmental objectives for §
1409(a)(4). 164 Addressing the government's first objective, the
existence of a biological relationship between the parent and the
child, the Court stated that it was important because "(tihe
mother's relation is verifiable from the birth itself and is
documented by the birth certificate or hospital records and the
witnesses to the birth" while "a father need not be present at the
birth, and his presence is not incontrovertible proof of
fatherhood."'165  The Court accepted the second governmental
155. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057.
156. See id. at 2058.
157. See Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 535 (5th Cir. 2000).
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 536.
161. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2058.
162. See id. at 2059.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 2060-61.
165. Id. at 2055.
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objective, "some demonstrated opportunity to develop a
relationship that consists of real, everyday ties providing a
connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the
United States," 166 because the government has an interest in
ensuring that the conveyance of citizenship relates to the "realities
of the child's own ties and allegiances."' 167 The Court again came
to this conclusion based on the difference between mothers and
fathers by stating that the opportunity to develop "real, everyday
ties providing a connection between child and citizen parent and,
in turn, the United States ... inheres in the event of birth in the
case of a citizen mother and her child, but does not result as a
matter of biological inevitability in the case of an unwed father."'168
The Court then stated that the means used to achieve the
government's objectives-legitimation by one of three
administrative methods before the child reaches the age of
eighteen-were substantially related to establishing a parent-child
relationship. 169 According to the Court, Congress chose an "easily
administered scheme" that avoided the "subjectivity,
intrusiveness, and difficulties of proof that might attend an
inquiry into any particular bond."'170 Nguyen argued that "clear
and convincing" evidence in the form of a DNA test was sufficient
to establish Boulais as his father. 171 Refusing to consider the
genetic test results together with evidence of Boulais and Nguyen's
father-child relationship, the Court stated that the importance of
the governmental interest was "too profound to be satisfied by a
DNA test because scientific proof of biological paternity does not,
by itself, ensure father-child contact during the child's
minority."172
The Court expressed extreme deference to Congress, stating,
"If citizenship is to be conferred by the unwitting means
petitioners urge, so that its acquisition abroad bears little relation
to the realities of the child's own ties and allegiances, it is for
Congress, not this Court, to make that determination."'173 Justices
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2063.
168. Id. at 2056.
169. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 59 (stating the three
administrative options to legitimate an illegitimate child born overseas).
170. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2064.
171. See id. at 2060-61.
172. Id. at 2056.
173. Id. at 2062. The Court stated:
Congress is well within its authority in refusing, absent proof of at least
the opportunity for the development of a relationship between citizen
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Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment, noting that they
did not believe the Court had the power to confer citizenship on a
basis other than one prescribed by Congress. 174 The two Justices,
however, concurred with the majority Justices that it could be
assumed that a majority of the Court would find the remedial
power to strike § 1409(a)(4) if necessary. 175 The Supreme Court,
voting five to four, affirmed the court of appeals opinion and held
that § 1409(a)(4) was consistent with the equal protection
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 176
The dissent, written by Justice O'Connor, began by noting
the history of gender-based discrimination in the United States
and the Court's use of heightened scrutiny when evaluating
statutes containing gender-based classifications. 177 The dissenting
Justices stated that the majority failed to apply properly the
intermediate scrutiny standard because it entertained empirical
support for governmental objectives behind the enactment of §
1409(a)(4). 178 They also argued that the means did not fit the
purported ends of establishing a blood relationship because §
1409(a)(1) already required clear and convincing evidence of a
biological relationship between the father and child. 179 O'Connor
argued that the requirement of legitimation before the child
turned eighteen was superfluous and therefore not a substantial
governmental interest. 8 0  The dissent further criticized §
1409(a)(4) as an "ill fit[ting]" proxy for a parental relationship
because it relied on the stereotype that mothers almost always
develop caring relationships with their children, while most
fathers do not.' 8 ' The dissent stated that the majority's discussion
"may itself simply reflect the stereotype of male irresponsibility
parent and child, to commit this country to embracing a child as a citizen
entitled as of birth to the full protection of the United States, to the
absolute right to enter its borders, and to full participation in the political
process.
Id. at 2056.
174. See id. at 2066 (Scalia, J., concurring).
175. See id.
176. See id. at 2058-66.
177. See id. at 2066-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's opinion. The dissent stated that the
important governmental objectives must be substantially related to the means used
to achieve them, and in addition, that the "reviewing court must determine
whether the proffered justification is exceedingly persuasive." Id. at 2067 (quoting
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996)) (internal quotes omitted).
178. See id. at 2066.
179. See id. at 2070.




that is no more a basis for the validity of the classification than
are stereotypes. about the 'traditional' behavior patterns of
women."182
III. Errors in the Supreme Court's Decision
A. The Supreme Court Had the Power to Review Whether
§ 1409 Was a Constitutionally Permissible Means of
Implementing Congress'Plenary Power
The Nguyen Court inappropriately deferred to Congress'
plenary power to regulate immigration. Congress' plenary power
over immigration appeared to be absolute until relatively
recently. 8 3 Recent decisions by the Supreme Court indicate that
Congress' power to regulate immigration is not as complete and
immune to judicial review as previously believed. 184
Similarly, Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
power was believed to be plenary. 185 Congress has the power "[tlo
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." 18 6 The Commerce power was
determined, however, to be limited internally by "[t]he wisdom and
the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the
influence which their constituents possess at elections."'187
Like the Commerce power, Congress' plenary immigration
power should be limited internally by similar factors. However,
people like Nguyen, who are aliens convicted of "crimes of
violence," and are thus deportable, are not looked upon favorably
by Congress. l88 The "wisdom of and discretion of Congress" will
not help where Congress does not care to check the interests of
convicted aliens. Moreover, Congress probably does not have an
"identity with" the aliens. Being a disenfranchised group, aliens
are politically powerless. 189 Due to the marginalized position of
182. Id. at 2077.
183. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
185. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat. 1) 1, 196 (1824) ("This power, like
all others vested on Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than one prescribed in the
Constitution.").
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
187. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
188. See supra note 93.
189. The exclusion of benefits for illegitimate children such as Nguyen in the




convicted aliens, it would have been reasonable for the Court to
deviate from its usual level of deference to Congress. 190
The Court had the authority to review the legitimation
requirement-the "unwitting means"191-because in challenging the
requirement, Nguyen did not question Congress' unquestionable
plenary power over aliens. Instead, Nguyen challenged, "whether
Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of
implementing [its plenary power]," which is open to judicial
review. The Court stated that it need not "assess the implications
of statements in our earlier cases regarding the wide deference
afforded to Congress in the exercise of its immigration and
naturalization power."192 A challenge to the procedure set forth by
Congress-the means by which Boulais was required to legitimate
his child to confer U.S. citizenship-is not a challenge to Congress'
power to regulate immigration, but a challenge to the method in
which Congress used its power. The Court should have clearly
stated that it could exercise judicial review because the question
before it was whether the legitimation procedures Congress
enacted are a constitutionally permissible means of implementing
its power over immigration.
B. The Court Erred in Hypothesizing and Accepting
Governmental Objectives Themselves Erroneously
Premised on the Idea That a Biological Relationship
Between a Mother and Her Child Necessarily Exists in
the Very Event of Birth
There is a colorable argument that the Court failed to apply
the correct standard of review as set forth in United States v.
Virginia. Virginia's standard of review requires "exceedingly
persuasive" justifications, but it appears that there is some
confusion among scholars and the courts as to whether the
exceedingly persuasive standard is a higher standard than the
traditional intermediate scrutiny standard. 193 The Nguyen Court
applied the traditional intermediate scrutiny standard. 9 4  By
doing so, the Court appeared to imply either that the correct
standard of review is the traditional standard, where important
governmental objectives must be met with substantially related
190. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
191. Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2001).
192. Id. at 2065.
193. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see supra note 104 and
accompanying text.
194. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2059.
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means, or that the exceedingly persuasive standard articulated in
Virginia was not meant to be any tougher than the traditional
intermediate scrutiny standard.
The Court misapplied the intermediate scrutiny standard by
entertaining hypothesized governmental objectives for the
enactment of § 1409(a)(4). 195 In following the standard articulated
in Virginia, the Court should have evaluated the justifications
that the government submitted to determine whether they were
"genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to
litigation."'196 The Court ignored statements of purpose of previous
immigration statutes that aimed to limit citizenship claims by
"those who may be a liability rather than an asset."'197 The Court
also ignored a statement made by the Attorney General in 1982
that § 1409 "needlessly provides for inequitable treatment of the
sexes." 98 These statements demonstrate that Congress did not
base the legislation on any "real" difference between men and
women. Instead, the statements show that § 1409 was intended to
protect U.S. citizen men from their unscrupulous and irresponsible
behavior when they are overseas by implementing an arbitrary
procedure for fathers of illegitimate children born abroad to
legitimate their children. 199 The protection granted to men under
§ 1409 perpetuates the cycle in which men are not held responsible
for their overseas sexual encounters, and is, in effect, a self-
validating statute. 200  By permitting Congress to claim the
existence of a biological parent-child relationship and the
opportunity for the parent and child to develop a meaningful
connection as important governmental objectives, the Court held
195. See id. at 2060-63.
196. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. The stated important governmental objective of
ensuring a biological relationship between the parent and child is in congruence
with the jus sanguinis citizenship principle that confers citizenship at the moment
of birth regardless of where the child is born. See supra notes 46-47 and
accompanying text.
197. H.R. REP. No. 76-2396, at 2 (1940).
198. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON WOMEN'S
EQUALITY, 128 CONG. REC. H5369, 5376 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1982); supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
199. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (illustrating the lack of political
power of aliens that makes this possible).
200. See GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 727 (3d ed. 1996) (citing
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982), in which she stated that the University's policy "makes the assumption
that nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy"); see also CATHARINE
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 3, 8-9 (1987)




the government to a lower standard of review than that of
intermediate scrutiny.
The Court based both of these governmental objectives on the
false assumption that a biological relationship necessarily exists
between a mother and her child by the event of birth. The Court
failed to recognize the advancement and increasing popularity of
alternative reproductive technologies when it assumed that the
woman giving birth to the child is necessarily the biological
mother of that child. 201 Where the mother is not the biological
mother, a biological parent-child relationship cannot inhere in the
very event of the birth of the child.202 While there is a chance that
the surrogate may attempt to claim parental rights over the child,
it is unlikely that the surrogate will receive any parental rights,
because a genetic relationship is absent, and there is most likely a
surrogacy contract with the genetic parents of the child. 20 3 Thus,
the majority's conclusion that "[f]athers and mothers are not
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological
parenthood"20 4  is outdated and does not recognize the
advancement of alternative reproductive technologies.
The Court instead embraced a familial structure based on the
old-fashioned and outdated idea of a nuclear family by assuming
that the very event of birth automatically established a parent-
child biological relationship. 20 5  The typical family no longer
necessarily consists of one mother, one father, and children.2 06
The Court's statements that the biological mother-child
relationship is "documented in most instances by the birth
certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her
having given birth" 207 and that "the mother is always present at
birth"208  raises questions as to its understanding of the
controversy surrounding legal parentage and which parents'
names are placed on birth certificates. 20 9
201. See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
204. Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2060 (2001).
205. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 113-122 and accompanying text.
207. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060.
208. Id. at 2061.
209. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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C. The Legitimation Procedures Are Not Substantially
Related to the Important Governmental Objectives
1. The Legitimation Requirements Are Not Substantially
Related To Ensure the Existence of a Biological Parent-
Child Relationship
The legitimation procedures of § 1409(a)(4) are not
substantially related to achieving the important governmental
objective of ensuring the existence of a biological parent-child
relationship. Section 1409(a)(1) already requires that a biological
relationship be established with clear and convincing evidence. 210
All three legitimation methods provided in § 1409(a)(4) are
superfluous. There is a rule of statutory construction that
surplusage be avoided. 211  The additional legitimation in §
1409(a)(4)(A) is, practically speaking, the same as the proof of
blood relationship required in § 1409(a)(1), since many states
simply require scientific proof of paternity in their legitimation
proceedings.212 Under the rule to avoid surplusage, the Court
should have looked at the repetitive nature of §§ 1409(a)(1) and
1409(a)(4) more critically.
The Court did acknowledge that the required methods are
not necessarily the most effective way to achieve the stated
important governmental interests.213 But under intermediate
level review, it is not necessary that the alternative means carry
out the asserted objectives as well or better without causing
needless disadvantage to anyone. 214  For the sake of
administrative convenience, the methods by which the
governmental interests are achieved may be less efficient than
other methods, but they still must satisfy the substantially related
test. 215  The legitimation procedures under § 1409(a)(4) were
210. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (2000) C'[A] blood relationship between the person
and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence.").
211. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion by
Scalia, J.) (stating that it is a "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no
provision should be construed to be entirely redundant"). Interpreting a statute
using the whole act rule, the interpreter should presume that every word and
phrase adds to the statutory command. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 369
n. 14 (1986).
212. Texas, for example, permits genetic testing results as evidence of parentage.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.621 (2001).
213. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2064 (2001).
214. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
215. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) ("[A]ny statutory
scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of
achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands 'dissimilar treatment
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administratively convenient, and thus only satisfied the lower
standard of rational basis scrutiny.
216
Acknowledgement of paternity under oath, an alternative
legitimation method under § 1409(a)(1)(B), could serve as a
substantially related alternative to a DNA test because the
potential father makes his assertions under a threat of the penalty
for perjury.217 However, where a blood relationship is already
proved by clear and convincing evidence under § 1409(a)(1), an
oath asserting paternity is superfluous. 218 The last legitimation
method under § 1409(a)(4)(C), adjudication by court, is similarly
superfluous. 219
DNA test results are a more reliable and substantially
related indicator of a biological relationship. 220 Nguyen argued
that he had provided clear and convincing evidence of parentage in
the form of a positive DNA test.2 21 Nguyen could show with
practically incontrovertible proof that he and Boulais had a
biological parent-child relationship. 222
The Supreme Court should have permitted DNA evidence of
the biological relationship because it is used and relied upon
extensively in courts nationwide.223 Courts permit the testimony
and evidence from physicians, geneticists, statisticians, and
technicians regarding the genetic probability that the defendant in
a paternity suit is the biological father. 2 4  In some states,
probabilities are not only permitted as evidence, but also create a
presumption of paternity that the alleged father must overcome
with clear and convincing evidence. 225 Even the Supreme Court
appears to be satisfied by the probabilities and availability of
scientific proof of parentage. 226
DNA testing has been used in immigration cases under
different circumstances. 227 Allowing Boulais to prove his paternity
for men and women who are ... similarly situated,' and therefore involves the 'very
kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution]."' (quoting Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971))).
216. See supra notes 169-170, 214-215 and accompanying text.
217. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2000).
218. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
219. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (2000) with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4)(C) (2000).
220. See supra notes 142-146 and accompanying text.
221. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060.
222. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 143.
225. See Kaye & Kanwischer, supra note 143, at 113-14 tbl.1.
226. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
227. See Davis, supra note 137, at 130-31. The author discussed an immigration
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by submitting a DNA test would have been logical in light of the
trend in state courts and the Supreme Court to permit DNA
tests.228 Denying the use of such tests to prove Boulais' biological
fatherhood cuts against many past decisions the Court has made
with regard to genetic testing.
Even if the means prescribed in § 1409(a)(4) were
substantially related to establishing a biological relationship
between the parent and child, the additional requirement of
performing the legitimation before the child reaches the age of
eighteen is not substantially related to establishing a biological
relationship. DNA tests are flexible and reliable. Samples may be
collected from any bodily fluid or tissue and at any time-even
years after a child turns eighteen-because the genetic makeup of
a person does not change over the course of his or her life. 229 Since
the "freshness" of the DNA is thus not an issue, the requirement
that a child be legitimated before the age of eighteen is not
substantially related to the purpose of ensuring the existence of a
biological relationship between the child and the parent.
2. The Legitimation Requirements Are Not Adequate to
Ensure the Opportunity to Establish a Meaningful
Parent-Child and Child-United States Relationship
Even if ensuring the existence of an opportunity to establish
a meaningful parent-child and child-United States relationship is
a sufficiently important governmental objective, the legitimation
procedures of § 1409(a)(4) are not substantially related to achieving
that end. The legitimation procedures are administrative tasks. If
the father knows that he must acknowledge paternity by
performing one of the three prescribed procedures to convey U.S.
citizenship, the three options are hardly a barrier to legitimating
his relationship with his child.230 The legitimation procedures are
so administrative in character that it is difficult to see how they
provide the opportunity for a father to establish the meaningful
relationship-one that might develop "real, everyday ties."231
case in which a son with U.S. citizenship used genetic testing to prove his foreign
national parents' parentage in order to gain them admission into the United States.
See id.
228. See supra notes 137-146 and accompanying text.
229. See Weiss et al., supra note 142, at 905.
230. See supra notes 213-219 and accompanying text.
231. The procedures are simple. There are websites that offer advice to fathers
on how to represent themselves pro se and even offer sample legal briefs. See, e.g.,
FATHERS ARE PARENTS Too!, BEING A FATHER TO YOUR CHILD AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF LEGITIMATING YOUR CHILD, at
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Simply because a father performs a legitimation procedure does
not necessarily mean that he has had the opportunity to establish
a meaningful relationship. For example, a father who only cares
about his illegitimate child for the purpose of claiming the child as
a dependent for a tax "write off' could easily overcome the
evidentiary requirements supposedly proving the existence of a
"meaningful relationship" between the father and the child. 232 The
legitimation methods are not sufficiently related to demonstrate
"real, everyday ties" such that the parent-child relationship that
exists is more significant than one "recognized ... by the law." 233
The Court's reliance on the "real difference" between men
and women as the reason for not requiring the mother to perform
the legitimation procedures is faulty. 234 The mother of the child
does not necessarily have the opportunity to establish a
meaningful relationship with her child by the very event of birth,
because the mother may not be the woman giving birth to the
child. The Court failed to acknowledge the increase in births
resulting from alternative reproductive technology. 23
5
Additionally, where the woman giving birth to the child is the
biological mother, the Court should not have relied on gender
stereotypes in determining that a mother has an inherent
connection with the child. 236 The idea that a mother has such a
connection with her child has been rejected with the replacement
of the "tender years doctrine" and the "best interests of the child"
principle. 237 No scientific studies have identified an "inherent"
bond between a mother and a child. 238 The Court had little, if any,
http://www.fapt.org/issues/legitimation.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
232. See LAWRENCE D. GORIN, DADS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, USA, TAX TIPS
FOR FATHERS OF CHILDREN BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK: CLAIM THE CHILD AS YOUR
DEPENDENT, (giving tax advice and advising that "custody does not matter"), at
http://www.dadsusa.com/tax.htm (last revised Feb. 2002); see also JEFF EDWARDS,
PATERNITY INFORMATION PAGE (providing legal advice to fathers of illegitimate
children on a web page "created to present paternity information for fathers from a
father's point of view"), at http://www.peak.org/-jedwards/paternity.html (last
updated Mar. 23, 2001).
233. Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2061 (2001).
234. See id. The Court further differentiated the relationship between a mother
and child from that between a father and child, stating, "The mother knows that
the child is in being and is hers and has an initial point of contact with him." Id. at
2061.
235. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
236. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 565-66 (1996) (stating that
Virginia must not assume the demand for a women's school of civil engineering or a
men's school of nursing based on gender stereotypes).
237. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
238. Although there are articles available studying the quality of childcare and
stability of mother-child relations, there are no articles that report a scientific link
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evidence on which to base its assumption that such a bond exists
between a mother and her child. Without this evidence, the Court
should not have made the assumption at all.
Fathers do not have to be at the birth of their child, but
neither does the biological mother when a surrogate is carrying
the biological mother's baby to term.239 The Court, while stating
that it would not rely on stereotypes when evaluating gender
classifications, stereotyped fathers of illegitimate children as
uncaring and uninterested in their children's lives. The Supreme
Court has recognized that fathers have an equally important right
to have a parental bond with their children as mothers do by
striking statutes that provide for dissimilar treatment for
similarly situated men and women.240 Additionally, there is a
trend among courts to prohibit custody decisions based on
stereotypes of sexual orientation. 24 1
The Court relied on its outdated ideas of the traditional
structure of the nuclear family when in fact alternative family
structures are becoming increasingly popular.242 Some states have
recognized that where the father is a surrogate by way of donating
sperm to a lesbian couple, he has a connection to the child and
therefore should receive visitation privileges.243 This shows the
trend in laws to recognize more and more fathers' rights and a
change in the structure of what once was perceived as the nuclear
family.244
The Court also gave undue merit to the government's
argument that the loyalty to the United States of an illegitimate
child born overseas to a U.S. citizen father is an important
consideration. 245 Congress infers loyalty of the illegitimate child
identifying the mysterious "inherent" bond. See, e.g., NICHD Early Child Care
Research Network, Child Care and Mother-Child Interaction in the First 3 Years of
Life, 35 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 6 (1999) (studying associations between
amount, quality and stability of child care and mother-child relationships); Pat
Etheridge, Study: Day Care Slightly Weakens Child-Mother Bond, CNN.COM (Nov.
8, 1999) (reporting study findings that day care affects the bond between a mother
and her young child negatively compared to the bond between stay-at-home
mothers and their children for whom they care at home), at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9911/08/daycare.dilemma/.
239. See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
241. See cases cited supra note 133 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mark K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
244. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
245. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977) ("In the inevitable process of
'line drawing,' Congress has determined that certain classes of aliens are more
likely than others to satisfy national objectives without undue cost, and it has
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born overseas as long as the mother is a U.S. citizen.246 It is
absurd to believe that loyalty and allegiance to the United States
passes in the very event of birth. The argument that somehow a
child of a father will be less loyal to the United States is based on
the stereotype that fathers do not want to have an important role
in raising the child. 247 A more substantially related means to
ensure the opportunity to establish a child's loyalty to the United
States would be the requirement of exposure to American history
and culture, whether it be in the form of living in the United
States or living with a U.S. citizen mother or father. 248
Conclusion
In the end, Nguyen got the short end of the deal. His father,
ignorant of the legitimation requirement, failed to complete one of
the three administrative tasks required before Nguyen turned
eighteen. The Court's biased views and stereotypes of the
character of a family, and what does and what should constitute a
father and a mother, underlie the Nguyen decision. Boulais and
Nguyen met the important governmental objectives of establishing
a meaningful relationship, yet they were unable to do so using the
means prescribed by the statute. The Court had the power to
granted preferential status only to those classes."). The politics involved in
immigration law and policy are complex. See WEISSBRODT, supra note 7, at 47.
People who argue against free immigration raise concerns regarding the potentially
decreased standard of living, while people who argue for free immigration raise
moral concerns such as how current citizens, themselves beneficiaries of
immigration, can exclude future immigrants. See id. at 47-48. Anti-immigration
proponents who value nationalism and loyalty to the United States also have a fear
of "cultural fragmentation," which stems from a concern that immigration will
eliminate a U.S. national identity. See id. at 47.
246. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2061 (2001). The Court imputes the
parent-child relationship to the relationship between the child and the United
States, discussing the connections as "real, everyday ties that provide a connection
between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States." Id.
247. See supra note 120 (rebutting the stereotype that fathers are typically not
interested in raising their children).
248. A test to prove exposure to American culture and values-whatever it is that
the government believes is a sign of loyalty-might be substantially related to the
achievement of the governmental objective of opportunity to establish a
relationship between the child and the United States. One example of the type of
test that might be substantially related is a simplified U.S. history test for children
with a low threshold for passing because the government cares about the
opportunity for the child to develop a relationship with the United States, not that
the child is actually loyal to the United States. An alternative test that is
substantially related to the important governmental objective of confirming a
meaningful relationship between a parent and the child would be to interview
them, similar to the interview process for married couples where one partner is a
U.S. citizen and the other is a foreign national wishing to gain U.S. residency.
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strike the statute for lack of substantial relationship between the
important governmental objectives and the means used. The
Court could have permitted genetic testing, a less restrictive
alternative means, to be used where the restrictive and less
related means of administrative legitimation had not taken place.
In an age in which fathers are gaining more rights in the
fields of custody and adoption, and children are gaining more
rights in establishing parenthood using genetic tests, the Supreme
Court's decision to stick with its outdated stereotypes of mothers
and fathers can only be due to their intentional blindness to the
changing times. In cases such as Tuan Anh Nguyen's, where he
may not have even known that he was not a U.S. citizen,
naturalization after the age of eighteen is not a practical solution.
He would only have taken affirmative steps to become naturalized
had he known. The Court's overly deferential attitude towards
Congress' arbitrary procedures and restrictions make children
such as Nguyen, born overseas and out of wedlock, the victims of
their parents' ignorance.
